We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results to broader cases. In particular, we prove that the better of the following two simple, deterministic and Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible mechanisms, a sequential posted price mechanism or an anonymous sequential posted price mechanism with entry fee, achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue among all randomized, Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms, when buyers' valuations are XOS over independent items. If the buyers' valuations are subadditive over independent items, the approximation factor degrades to O(log m), where m is the number of items. We obtain our results by first extending the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework to derive an effective benchmark of the optimal revenue for subadditive bidders, and then analyzing this upper bound with new techniques.
INTRODUCTION
In Mechanism Design, we aim to design a mechanism/system such that a group of strategic participants, who are only interested in optimizing their own utilities, are incentivized to choose actions that also help achieve the designer's objective. Clearly, the quality of the solution with respect to the designer's objective is crucial. However, perhaps one should also pay equal attention to another Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. STOC'17, Montreal, Canada © 2017 ACM. 978-1-4503-4528-6/17/06. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/3055399.3055465 criterion of a mechanism, that is, its simplicity. When facing a complicated mechanism, participants may be confused by the rules and thus unable to optimize their actions and react in unpredictable ways instead. This may lead to undesirable outcomes and poor performance of the mechanism. An ideal mechanism would be optimal and simple. However, such cases of simple mechanisms being optimal only exist in single-item auctions, with the seminal examples of auctions by Vickrey [44] and Myerson [37] , while none has been discovered in broader settings. Indeed, we now know that even in fairly simple settings the optimal mechanisms suffer many undesirable properties including randomization, non-monotonicity, and others [4, 17, 18, 31, 32, 38, 39, 43] . To move forward, one has to compromise -either settle with optimal but somewhat complex mechanisms or turn to simple but approximately optimal solutions.
Recently, there has been extensive research effort focusing on the latter approach, that is, studying the performance of simple mechanisms through the lens of approximation. In particular, a central problem on this front is how to design simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in multi-item settings. For instance, when bidders have unit-demand valuations, we know sequential posted price mechanisms approximates the optimal revenue due to a line of work initiated by Chawla et al. [9, 12, 13, 15] . When buyers have additive valuations, we know that either selling the items separately or running a VCG mechanism with per bidder entry fee approximates the optimal revenue due to a series of work initiated by Hart and Nisan [1, 9, 10, 30, 35, 45] . Recently, Chawla and Miller [16] generalized the two lines of work described above to matroid rank functions 1 . They show that a simple mechanism, the sequential twopart tariff mechanism, suffices to extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. For subadditive valuations beyond matroid rank functions, we only know how to handle a single buyer [40] 2 . It is a major open problem to extend this result to multiple subadditive buyers.
In this paper, we unify and strengthen all the results mentioned above via an extension of the duality framework proposed by Cai et al. [9] . Moreover, we show that even when there are multiple buyers with XOS valuation functions, there exists a simple, deterministic and Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanism that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal Bayesian Incentive 1 Here is a hierarchy of the valuation functions. additive & unit-demand ⊆ matroid rank ⊆ constrained additive & submodular ⊆ XOS ⊆ subadditive. A function is constrained additive if it is additive up to some downward closed feasibility constraints. The class of submodular functions is neither a superset nor a subset of the class of constrained additive functions. See Definition 2.2 for the formal definition. 2 All results mentioned above assume that the buyers' valuation distributions are over independent items. For additive and unit-demand valuations, this means a bidder's values for the items are independent. The definition is generalized to subadditive valuations by Rubinstein and Weinberg [40] . See Definition 2.1.
Compatible (BIC) revenue 3 . For subadditive valuations, our approximation ratio degrades to O(log m).
INFORMAL THEOREM 1. There exists a simple, deterministic and DSIC mechanism that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal BIC revenue in multi-item settings, when the buyers' valuation distributions are XOS over independent items. When the buyers' valuation distributions are subadditive over independent items, our mechanism achieves at least Ω( 1 log m ) of the optimal BIC revenue, where m is the number of items.
The original paper by Cai et al. [9] provided a unified treatment for additive and unit-demand valuations. However, it is inadequate to provide an analyzable benchmark for even a single subadditive bidder. In this paper, we show how to extend their duality framework to accommodate general subadditive valuations. Using this extended framework, we substantially improve the approximation ratios for many of the settings discussed above, and in the meantime generalize the results to broader cases. See Table 1 for the comparison between the best ratios reported in the literature and the new ratios obtained in this work.
Our mechanism is either a rationed sequential posted price mechanism (RSPM) or an anonymous sequential posted price with entry fee mechanism (ASPE). In an RSPM, there is a price pij for buyer i if she wants to buy item j, and she is allowed to purchase at most one item. We visit the buyers in some arbitrary order and the buyer takes her favorite item among the available items given the item prices for her. Here we allow personalized prices, that is, pij could be different from p kj if i = k. In an ASPE, every buyer faces the same collection of item prices {pj} j∈ [m] . Again, we visit the buyers in some arbitrary order. For each buyer, we show her the available items and the associated price for each item. Then we ask her to pay the entry fee to enter the mechanism, which may depend on what items are still available and the identity of the buyer. If the buyer accepts the entry fee, she can proceed to purchase any item at the given prices; if she rejects the entry fee, then she will leave the mechanism without receiving anything. Given the entry fee and item prices, the decision making for the buyer is straightforward, as she only accepts the entry fee when the surplus for winning her favorite bundle is larger than the entry fee. Therefore, both RSPM and ASPE are DSIC and ex-post Individually Rational (ex-post IR).
Our Contributions
To obtain the new generalizations, we provide important extensions to the duality framework in [9] , as well as novel analytic techniques and new simple mechanisms.
1. Accommodating subadditive valuations: the original duality framework in [9] already unified the additive case and unit-demand case by providing an approximately tight upper bound for the optimal revenue using a single dual solution. A trivial upper bound for the revenue is the social welfare, which may be arbitrarily bad in the worst case. The duality based upper bound in [9] improves this trivial upper bound, the social welfare, by substituting the value of each buyer's favorite item with the corresponding Myerson's 3 A mechanism is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if it is in every bidder's interest to tell the truth, assuming that all other bidders' reported their values. A mechanism is Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) if it is in every bidder's interest to tell the truth no matter what reports the other bidders make. virtual value. However, the substitution is viable only when the following condition holds -the buyer's marginal gain for adding an item solely depends on her value for that item (assuming it's feasible to add that item 4 ), but not the set of items she has already received. This applies to valuations that are additive, unit-demand and more generally constrained additive, but breaks under more general valuation functions, e.g., submodular, XOS or subadditive valuations. As a consequence, the original dual solution from [9] fails to provide a nice upper bound for more general valuations. To overcome this difficulty, we take a different approach. Instead of directly studying the dual of the original problem, we first relax the valuations and argue that the optimal revenue of the relaxed valuation is comparable to the original one. Then, since we choose the relaxation in a particular way, by applying a dual solution similar to the one in [9] to the relaxed valuation, we recover an upper bound of the optimal revenue for the relaxed valuation resembling the appealing format of the one in [9] . Combining these two steps, we obtain an upper bound for subadditive valuations that is easy to analyze. Indeed, we use our new upper bound to improve the approximation ratio for a single subadditive buyer from 338 [40] to 40. See Section 5.1 for more details.
2. An adaptive dual: our second major change to the framework is that we choose the dual in an adaptive manner. In [9] , a dual solution λ is chosen up front inducing a virtual value function Φ(·), then the corresponding optimal virtual welfare is used as a benchmark for the optimal revenue. Finally, it is shown that the revenue of some simple mechanism is within a constant factor of the optimal virtual welfare. Unfortunately, when the valuations are beyond additive and unit-demand, the optimal virtual welfare for this particular choice of virtual value function becomes extremely complex and hard to analyze. Indeed, it is already challenging to bound when the buyers' valuations are k-demand. In this paper, we take a more flexible approach. For any particular allocation rule σ, we tailor a special dual λ (σ) based on σ in a fashion that is inspired by Chawla and Miller's ex-ante relaxation [16] . Therefore, the induced virtual valuation Φ (σ) also depends on σ. By duality, we can show that the optimal revenue obtainable by σ is still upper bounded by the virtual welfare with respect to Φ (σ) under allocation rule σ. Since the virtual valuation is designed specifically for allocation σ, the induced virtual welfare is much easier to analyze. Indeed, we manage to prove that for any allocation σ the induced virtual welfare is within a constant factor of the revenue of some simple mechanism, when bidders have XOS valuations. See Section 5.2 and 5.3 for more details.
A novel analysis and new mechanism:
with the two contributions above, we manage to derive an upper bound of the optimal revenue similar to the one in [9] but for subadditive bidders. The third major contribution of this paper is a novel approach to analyzing this upper bound. The analysis in [9] essentially breaks the upper bound into three different terms-SINGLE, TAIL and CORE, and bound them separately. All three terms are relatively simple to bound for additive and unit-demand buyers, but for more general settings the CORE becomes much more challenging to handle. Indeed, the analysis in [9] was not sufficient to tackle the CORE even when O(log m) * The result is implied by another result for a more general setting. Table 1 : Comparison of approximation ratios between previous and current work.
the buyers have k-demand valuations 5 . A recent paper by Chawla and Miller [16] essentially showed how to bound the CORE for matroid rank valuations using a sequential posted price mechanism by applying the online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) developed by Feldman et al. [25] . The connection with OCRS is an elegant observation, and one might hope the same technique applies to more general valuations. Unfortunately, OCRS is only known to exist for special cases of downward closed constraints, and as we show in Section 7.2.1, the approach by Chawla and Miller cannot yield any constant factor approximation for general constrained additive valuations.
We take an entirely different approach to bound the CORE. Here we provide some intuition behind our mechanism and analysis. The CORE is essentially the optimal social welfare induced by some truncated valuation v , and our goal is to design a mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the welfare as revenue. Let M be any sequential posted price mechanism. A key observation is that when bidder i's valuation is subadditive over independent items, her utility in M , which is the largest surplus she can achieve from the unsold items, is also subadditive over independent items. If we can argue that her utility function is a-Lipschitz (Definition 6.6) with some small a, Talagrand's concentration inequality [41, 42] allows us to set an entry fee for the bidder so that we can extract a constant fraction of her utility just through the entry fee. If we modify M by introducing an entry fee for every bidder, according to Talagrand's concentration inequality, the new mechanism M should intuitively have revenue that is a constant fraction of the social welfare obtained by M 6 . Therefore, if there exists a sequential posted price mechanism M that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal social welfare under the truncated valuation v , the modified mechanism M can obtain a constant fraction of CORE as revenue. Surprisingly, when the bidders have XOS valuations, Feldman et al. [24] showed that there exists an anonymous sequential posted price mechanism that always obtains at least half of the optimal social welfare. Hence, an anonymous sequential posted price with per bidder entry fee mechanism should approximate the CORE well, and this is exactly the intuition behind our ASPE mechanism.
To turn the intuition into a theorem, there are two technical difficulties that we need to address: (i) the Lipschitz constants of the bidders' utility functions turn out to be too large (ii) we deliberately neglected the difference in bidders' behavior under M and M in 5 The class of k-demand valuations is a generalization of unit-demand valuations, where the buyer's value is additive up to k items. 6 M 's welfare is simply its revenue plus the sum of utilities of the bidders, and M can extract some extra revenue from the entry fee, which is a constant fraction of the total utility from the bidders. hope to keep our discussion in the previous paragraph intuitive. However, due to the entry fee, bidders may end up purchasing completely different items under M and M , so it is not straightforward to see how one can relate the revenue of M to the welfare obtained by M . See Section 7.2.1 for a more detailed discussion on how we overcome these two difficulties.
Related Work
In recent years, we have witnessed several breakthroughs in designing (approximately) optimal mechanisms in multi-dimensional settings. The black-box reduction by Cai et al. [5] [6] [7] [8] shows that we can reduce any Bayesian mechanism design problem to a similar algorithm design problem via convex optimization. Through their reduction, it is proved that all optimal mechanisms can be characterized as a distribution of virtual welfare maximizers, where the virtual valuations are computed by an LP. Although this characterization provides important insights about the structure of the optimal mechanism, the optimal allocation rule is unavoidably randomized and might still be complex as the virtual valuations are only a solution of an LP.
Another line of work considers the "Simple vs. Optimal" auction design problem. For instance, a sequence of results [12] [13] [14] [15] show that sequential posted price mechanism can achieve 1 33.75 of the optimal revenue, whenever the buyers have unit-demand valuations over independent items. Another series of results [1, 10, 30, 35, 45] show that the better of selling the items separately and running the VCG mechanism with per bidder entry fee achieves 1 69 of the optimal revenue, whenever the buyers' valuations are additive over independent items. Cai et al. [9] unified the two lines of results and improved the approximation ratios to 1 8 for the additive case and 1 24 for the unit-demand case using their duality framework. Some recent works have shown that simple mechanisms can approximate the optimal revenue even when buyers have more sophisticated valuations. For instance, Chawla and Miller [16] showed that the sequential two-part tariff mechanism can approximate the optimal revenue when buyers have matroid rank valuation functions over independent items. Their mechanism requires every buyer to pay an entry fee up front, and then run a sequential posted price mechanism on buyers who have accepted the entry fee. Our ASPE is similar to their mechanism, but with two major differences: (i) since buyers are asked to pay the entry fee before the seller visits them, the buyers have to make their decisions based on the expected utility (assuming every other buyer behaves truthfully) they can receive. Hence, the mechanism is only guaranteed to be BIC and interim IR. While in our mechanism, the buyers can see what items are still available before paying the entry fee, therefore the decision making is straightforward and the ASPE is DSIC and ex-post IR; (ii) the item prices in the ASPE are anonymous, while in the sequential two-part tariff mechanism, personalized prices are allowed. For valuations beyond matroid rank functions, Rubinstein and Weinberg [40] showed that for a single buyer whose valuation is subadditive over independent items, either grand bundling or selling the items separately achieves at least 1 338 of the optimal revenue. The Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework [9] has been applied to other intriguing Mechanism Design problems. For example, Eden et al. showed that the better of selling separately and bundling together gets an O(d)-approximation for a single bidder with "complementarity-d valuations over independent items" [23] . The same authors also proved a Bulow-Klemperer result for regular i.i.d. and constrained additive bidders [22] . Finally, Liu and Psomas provided a Bulow-Klemperer result for dynamic auctions [36] .
Strong duality frameworks have recently been developed for one additive buyer [17, 19, [26] [27] [28] . These frameworks show that the dual problem of revenue maximization can be viewed as an optimal transport/bipartite matching problem. Hartline and Haghpanah provided an alternative duality framework in [29] . They showed that if certain paths exist, these paths provide a witness of the optimality of a certain Myerson-type mechanism, but these paths are not guaranteed to exist in general. Similar to the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg framework, Carroll [11] independently made use of a partial Lagrangian over incentive constraints. These duality frameworks have been successfully provide conditions under which a certain type of mechanism is optimal when there is a single unit-demand or additive bidder. However, none of these frameworks succeeds in yielding any approximately optimal results in multi-buyer settings.
PRELIMINARIES
We focus on revenue maximization in the combinatorial auction with n independent bidders and m heterogenous items. Each bidder has a valuation that is subadditive over independent items (see Definition 2.1). We denote bidder i's type ti as tij m j=1 , where tij is bidder i's private information about item j. For each i, j, we assume tij is drawn independently from the distribution Dij. Let Di = × m j=1 Dij be the distribution of bidder i's type and D = × n i=1 Di be the distribution of the type profile. We use Tij (or Ti, T ) and fij (or fi, f ) to denote the support and density function of Dij (or Di, D). For notational convenience, we let t−i to be the types of all bidders except i and t<i (or t ≤i ) to be the types of the first i − 1 (or i) bidders. Similarly, we define D−i, T−i and f−i for the corresponding distributions, support sets and density functions. When bidder i's type is ti, her valuation for a set of items S is denoted by vi(ti, S).
Definition 2.1.
[40] For every bidder i, whose type is drawn from a product distribution Fi = j Fij, her distribution Vi of valuation function vi(ti, ·) is subadditive over independent items if:
vi(·, ·) has no externalities, i.e., for each ti ∈ Ti and S ⊆ [m], vi(ti, S) only depends on tij j∈S , formally, for any t i ∈ Ti such that t ij = tij for all j ∈ S, vi(t i , S) = vi(ti, S).
vi(·, ·) is monotone, i.e., for all ti ∈ Ti and
We use Vi(tij) to denote vi(ti, {j}), as it only depends on tij. When vi(ti, ·) is XOS (or constrained additive) for all i and ti ∈ Ti, we say Vi is XOS (or constrained additive) over independent items.
We first formally define various valuation classes. Definition 2.2. We define several classes of valuations formally. Let t be the type and v(t, S) be the value for bundle
is a downward closed set system over the items specifying the feasible bundles. In particular, when I = 2 [m] , the valuation is an additive function; when I = {{j} | j ∈ [m]}, the valuation is a unit-demand function; when I is a matroid, the valuation is a matroid-rank function. An equivalent way to represent any constrained additive valuations is to view the function as additive but the bidder is only allowed to receive bundles that are feasible, i.e., bundles in I. To ease notations, we interpret t as an
The following are a few examples of various valuation distributions which are over independent items (Definition 2.1):
• Additive: tj is the value of item j. v(t, S) = j∈S tj.
• Unit-demand: tj is the value of item j. v(t, S) = maxj∈S tj. • Constrained Additive: tj is the value of item j. v(t, S) = max R⊆S,R∈I j∈R tj.
• XOS/Fractionally Subadditive: tj = {t Given D and v = {vi(·, ·)} i∈[n] , we use REV(M, v, D) to denote the expected revenue of a BIC mechanism M . Throughout the paper, we use the following notations for the simple mechanisms we consider.
Single-Bidder Mechanisms: -SREV(v, D) denotes the optimal expected revenue achievable by any posted price mechanism that only allows the buyer to purchase at most one item, and we use SREV for short if there is no confusion 7 .
-BREV(v, D) denotes the optimal expected revenue achievable by selling a grand bundle and we use BREV for short if there is no confusion.
Multi-Bidder Mechanisms: -POSTREV(v, D) denotes the optimal expected revenue achievable by selling the items via an RSPM to the bidders, and we use POSTREV for short when there is no confusion.
-APOSTENREV(v, D) denotes the optimal expected revenue achievable by selling the items via an ASPE to the bidders, and we use APOSTENREV for short when there is no confusion.
Single-Dimensional Copies Setting: In the analysis for unit-demand bidders in [9, 13] , the optimal revenue is upper bounded by the optimal revenue in the single-dimensional copies setting defined in [13] . We use the same technique. We construct nm agents, where agent (i, j) has value Vi(tij) of being served with tij ∼ Dij, and we are only allow to use matchings, that is, for each i at most one agent (i, k) is served and for each j at most one agent (k, j) is served 8 . Notice that this is a single-dimensional setting, as each agent's type is specified by a single number. Let OPT COPIES-UD be the optimal BIC revenue in this copies setting.
Continuous vs. Discrete Distributions:
We explicitly assume that the input distributions are discrete. Nevertheless, it is known that every D can be discretized into D + such that the optimal revenue for D and D + are within (1 ± ) of each other [9] . So our results also apply to continuous distributions.
Our Mechanisms
In this section, we introduce a class of mechanisms called Sequential Posted Price with Entry Fee. For each bidder i, the mechanism first determines a posted price ξij for each item j and an entry fee function δi(·) : 2 [m] → R ≥0 for each bidder i that maps the set of available items to a real value entry fee. The seller visits the bidders sequentially in some arbitrary order. For simplicity, we assume the bidders are visited in the lexicographical order. When bidder i is visited, let Si(t<i) be the set of items that are still available. Clearly, this set only depends on the types of bidders who are visited before i. The mechanism shows the set Si(t<i) to bidder i and asks her for an entry fee δi(Si(t<i)). If she accepts the entry fee, she can enter the mechanism and take her favorite bundle S * i by paying j∈S * i ξij. If there exist multiple bundles with the same maximum surplus, the bidder can break ties arbitrarily. Sometimes, there is a feasibility constraint F on what items a buyer can purchase. In particular, if we say the mechanism is rationed, then F = {∅}∪{{j} | j ∈ [m]}, i.e., a buyer can purchase at most one item. Formally, the favorite bundle S * i is defined as follows:
See Algorithm 1 for the formal specification of the above mechanism. Notice that before the bidder decides whether to pay the entry fee, she is aware of the set Si(t<i) which contains all available items. Thus, she can compute her favorite bundle S * i and the corresponding utility if she chooses to enter the mechanism. She can then compare that utility with the entry fee and accept the entry fee if the former is greater than the latter. The mechanism described above is therefore deterministic and DSIC. Throughout this paper, we focus on the following two special cases of this class of mechanisms:
-Rationed Sequential Posted Price Mechanism (RSPM): Every buyer can purchase at most one item and the mechanism always Algorithm 1 Sequential Posted Price with Entry Fee Mechanism Require: ξij is the price for bidder i to purchase item j and δi(·) is bidder i's entry fee function.
Show bidder i the set of available items S, and define entry fee as δi(S).
4:
if Bidder i pays the entry fee δi(S) then 5: i receives her favorite bundle S * i , paying j∈S * i ξij.
6:
S ← S\S * i .
7:
else 8: i gets nothing and pays 0. -Anonymous Sequential Posted Price with Entry Fee Mechanism (ASPE): The mechanism uses anonymous posted prices, i.e., ξij = ξ kj for any item j and bidders i = k, but may charge positive and personalized entry fee. Also, any buyer can purchase any bundle available once she has paid the entry fee, i.e., F = 2 [m] .
PAPER ORGANIZATION
In this section, we provide the roadmap to our paper. In Section 4, we review the Duality framework of [9] .
In Section 5, we derive an upper bound of the optimal revenue for subadditive bidders by combining the duality framework with our new techniques, i.e. valuation relaxation and adaptive dual variables. Our main result in this section, Theorem 5.5, shows that the revenue can be upper bounded by two terms -NON-FAVORITE and SINGLE defined in Lemma 5.4.
In Section 6, we use the single bidder case to familiarize the readers with some basic ideas and techniques used to bound SINGLE and NON-FAVORITE. The main result of this section, Theorem 6.1, shows that the optimal revenue for a single subadditive bidder is upper bounded by 24SREV and 16BREV.
Section 7 contains the main result of this paper. We show how to upper bound the optimal revenue for XOS (or subadditive) bidders with a constant number of (or O(log m)) POSTREV (the optimal revenue obtainable by an RSPM) and APOSTENREV ((the optimal revenue obtainable by an ASPE). In particular, SINGLE can be upper bounded by the optimal revenue OPT COPIES-UD in the copies setting which is again upper bounded by 6POSTREV. We further decompose NON-FAVORITE into two terms TAIL and CORE, and show how to bound TAIL in Section 7.1 and how to bound CORE in Section 7.2.
DUALITY
The focus of [9] was on additive and unit-demand valuations and their respective dual was derived from an LP that is only meaningful for constrained additive valuations. In order to tackle general valuations, we need to apply the duality framework to an LP that is meaningful for general valuations. Instead of using the "implicit forms" LP from [8, 9] , we choose a slightly different and more intuitive LP formulation (see Figure 1 ). For all bidders i and types ti ∈ Ti, we use pi(ti) as the interim price paid by bidder i and σiS(ti) as the interim probability of receiving the exact bundle S. To ease the notation, we use a special type ∅ to represent the choice of not participating in the mechanism. More specifically, σiS(∅) = 0 for any S and pi(∅) = 0. Now a Bayesian IR (BIR) constraint is simply another BIC constraint: for any type ti, bidder i will not want to lie to type ∅. We let T + i = Ti ∪ {∅}. Following the recipe provided by [9] , we take the partial Lagrangian dual of the LP in Figure 1 by lagrangifying the BIC constraints. Let λi(ti, t i ) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the BIC constraint that if bidder i's true type is ti she will not prefer to lie to type t i (see Figure 2 and Definition 4.1). As shown in [9] , the dual solution has finite value if and only if the dual variables λi form a valid flow for every bidder i. The reason is that the payments pi(ti) are unconstrained variables, therefore the corresponding coefficients must be 0 in order for the dual solution to have finite value. It turns out when all these coefficients are 0, the dual variables λ can be interpreted as a flow described in Lemma 4.2. We refer the readers to [9] for a complete proof. From now on, we only consider λ that corresponds to a flow. 
λ is useful iff for each bidder i, λi forms a valid flow, i.e., iff the following satisfies flow conservation at all nodes except the source and the sink: 1. Nodes: A super source s and a super sink ∅, along with a node ti for every type ti ∈ Ti.
2. An edge from s to ti with flow fi(ti), for all ti ∈ Ti.
3. An edge from ti to t i with flow λi(ti, t i ) for all ti ∈ Ti, and t i ∈ T + i (including the sink). .
Variables:
• pi(ti), for all bidders i and types ti ∈ Ti, denoting the expected price paid by bidder i when reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and the other bidders' types. • σiS(ti), for all bidders i, all bundles of items S ⊆ [m], and types ti ∈ Ti, denoting the probability that bidder i receives exactly the bundle S when reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and the other bidders' types. Constraints:
, for all bidders i, and types ti ∈ Ti, t i ∈ T + i , guaranteeing that the reduced form mechanism (σ, p) is BIC and Bayesian IR.
, the expected revenue. Variables:
• λi(ti, t i ) for all i, ti ∈ Ti, t i ∈ T + i , the Lagrangian multipliers for Bayesian IC and IR constraints. The proof of Theorem 4.4 is essentially the same as in [9] . THEOREM 4.4 (VIRTUAL WELFARE ≥ REVENUE [9] ). For any flow λ and any BIC mechanism M = (σ, p), the revenue of M is ≤ the virtual welfare of σ w.r.t. the virtual valuation Φ(·) corresponding to λ.
Let λ * be the optimal dual variables and M * = (σ * , p * ) be the revenue optimal BIC mechanism, then the expected virtual welfare with respect to Φ * (induced by λ * ) under σ * equals to the expected revenue of M * .
CANONICAL FLOW AND PROPERTIES OF THE VIRTUAL VALUATIONS
In this section, we present a canonical way of setting the dual variables/flow that induces our benchmarks. Although any flow can provide a finite upper bound of the optimal revenue, we focus on a For additive valuations and any type ti ∈ R (β i ) j , the contribution to the virtual value function Φ(ti, S) from any type t i ∈ R
if ti, t i only differs on the j-th coordinate and j ∈ S. In either case, the contribution does not depend on t ik for any k = j. This is the key property that allows [9] to choose a flow such that the value of the favorite item is replaced by the corresponding Myerson's ironed virtual value in the virtual value function Φi(ti, ·). Unfortunately, this property no longer holds for subadditive valuations. When j ∈ S and λ i (t i , ti) · Vi(t ij )] 9 , but this is not sufficient for us to convert the value of item j into the corresponding Myerson's ironed virtual value.
Valuation Relaxation
This is the first major barrier for extending the duality framework to accommodate subadditive valuations. We overcome it by considering a relaxation of the valuation functions. More specifically, for any β, we construct another function v
for every buyer i such that: (i) for any ti, v (β i ) i (ti, ·) is subadditive and monotone, and for every bundle S the new value v (β i ) i (ti, S) is no smaller than the original value vi(ti, S); (ii) for any BIC mechanism M with respect to the original valuations, there exists another mechanism M (β) that is BIC with respect to the new valuations and its revenue is comparable to the revenue of M ; (iii) for the new valuations v (β) , there exists a flow whose induced virtual value functions have properties similar to those in the additive case. Property (ii) implies that the optimal revenue with respect to v (β) can serve as a proxy for the original optimal revenue. Moreover, due to Theorem 4.4, the optimal revenue for v (β) is upper bounded by the partial Lagrangian dual with respect to v (β) , which has an appealing format similar to the additive case by property (iii). Thus, we obtain a benchmark for subadditive bidders that resembles the benchmark for additive bidders in [9] . In the next Lemma, we show that for any BIC mechanism M for v, there exists a BIC mechanism M (β) for v (β) such that its revenue is comparable to the revenue of M (property (ii)). Moreover, the ex-ante probability for any buyer i to receive any item j in M (β) is no greater than in M (property (i)). We will see later that this is an important property for our analysis. The proof of Lemma 5.2 is similar to the -BIC to BIC reduction in [2, 20, 33] . The proof can be found in the full version of the paper. LEMMA 5.2. For any β and any BIC mechanism M for subadditive valuation {vi(ti, ·)} i∈[n] with ti ∼ Di for all i, there exists a BIC mechanism M (β) for valuations {v D) ) is the revenue of the mechanism M (or M (β) ) while the buyers' types are drawn from D and buyer i's valuation is vi(ti, ·) (or v (β i ) i (ti, ·)). σiS(ti) (or σ (β) iS (ti)) is the probability of buyer i receiving exactly bundle S when her reported type is ti in mechanism M (or M (β) ).
Virtual Valuation for the Relaxed Valuation
For any β, based on the same partition of the type sets as in the beginning of Section 5, we construct a flow λ (β) that respects the partial specification, such that the corresponding virtual valuation function for v (β) has the same appealing properties as in the additive case. For the relaxed valuation, as λ (β) i (ti, t i ) is only positive for types ti, t i ∈ R (β i ) j that only differ in the j-th coordinate, the contribution from item j to the virtual valuation solely depends on tij and t ij but not t ik for any other item k ∈ S . Notice that this property does not hold for the original valuation, and it is the main reason why we choose the relaxed valuation as in Definition 5.1. Moreover, we can choose λ (β) i carefully so that the virtual valuation of v (β) has the following format: 
For any
∈ S] + (vi(ti, S\{j}) +φij(Vi(tij))) · 1[j ∈ S], whereφij(Vi(tij)) is the Myerson's ironed virtual value for Vi(tij) with respect to Fij.
The proof of Lemma 5.3 is omitted due to the space limit and can be found in the full version. Next, we use the virtual welfare of the allocation σ (β) to bound the revenue of M (β) . S) , which is again upper bounded by the following 
Upper Bound for the Revenue of Subadditive Buyers
In Section 5.1, we have argued that for any β, there exists a mechanism M (β) such that its revenue with respect to the relaxed valuation v (β) is comparable to the revenue of M with respect to the original valuation. In Section 5.2, we have shown for any β how to choose a flow to obtain an upper bound for REV(M (β) , v (β) , D) and also an upper bound for REV(M, v, D). Now we specify our choice of β.
In [9] , the authors fixed a particular β, and shown that under any allocation rule, the corresponding benchmark can be bounded by the sum of the revenue of a few simple mechanisms. However, for valuations beyond additive and unit-demand, the benchmark becomes much more challenging to analyze 10 . We adopt an alternative and more flexible approach to obtain a new upper bound. Instead of fixing a single β for all mechanisms, we customize a different β 10 Indeed, the difficulties already arise for valuations as simple as k-demand. A bidder's valuation is k-demand if her valuation is additive subject to a uniform matroid with rank k.
for every different mechanism M . Next, we relax the valuation and design the flow based on the chosen β as specified in Section 5.1 and 5.2. Then we upper bound the revenue of M with the benchmark in Theorem 5.5 and argue that for any mechanism M , the corresponding benchmark can be upper bounded by the sum of the revenue of a few simple mechanisms. As we allow β, in other words the flow λ (β) , to depend on the mechanism, our new approach may provide a better upper bound. As it turns out, our new upper bound is indeed easier to analyze.
Lemma 5.6 specifies the two properties of our β that play the most crucial roles in our analysis. We construct such a β in the proof of Lemma 5.6, however the construction is not necessarily unique and any β satisfying these two properties suffices. Note that our construction heavily relies on property (i) of Lemma 5.2.
LEMMA 5.6. For any constant b ∈ (0, 1) and any mechanism M , there exists a β such that: for the mechanism M (β) constructed in Lemma 5.2 according to β, any i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
We only provide some intuition behind the two required properties. The complete proof can be found in the full version of the paper. Property (i) is used to guarantee that if item j's price for bidder i is higher than βij for all i and j in an RSPM, for any item j and any bidder i , j is still available with probability at least (1 − b) when i is visited. As for any bidder k = i to purchase item j , V k (t kj ) must be greater than her price for item j . By the union bound, the probability that there exists such a bidder is upper bounded by the LHS of property (i), and therefore is at most b. With this guarantee, we can easily show that the RSPM achieves good revenue (Lemma 7.8). Property (ii) states that the ex-ante probability for bidder i to receive an item j in M (β) is not much bigger than the probability that bidder i's value is larger than item j. This is crucial for proving our key Lemma 7.17, in which we argue that two different valuations provide comparable welfare under the same allocation rule σ (β) . With Lemma 7.17, we can show that the ASPE obtains good revenue.
WARM UP: SINGLE BIDDER
To warm up, we first study the case where there is a single subadditive buyer and show how to improve the approximation ratio from 338 to 40. Since there is only one buyer, we will drop the subscript i in the notations. As specified in Section 5.3, we use a β that satisfies both properties in Lemma 5.6. For a single buyer, we can simply set βj to be 0 for all j. We use SINGLE(M ), NON-FAVORITE(M ) in the following proof to denote the corresponding terms in Theorem 5.5 for β = 0. Notice R (0) 0 = ∅. Theorem 6.1 shows that the optimal revenue is within a constant factor of the better of selling separately and grand bundling. THEOREM 6.1. For a single buyer whose valuation distribution is subadditive over independent items, REV(M, v, D) ≤ 24·SREV+ 16 · BREV, for any BIC mechanism M .
Recall that the revenue for mechanism M is upper bounded by 4 · NON-FAVORITE(M ) + 2 · SINGLE(M ) (Theorem 5.5). We first upper bound SINGLE(M ) by OPT COPIES-UD . Since σ (β) S (t) is a feasible allocation in the original setting,
S (t) is a feasible allocation in the copies setting, and therefore SINGLE(M ) is the Myerson Virtual Welfare of a certain allocation in the copies setting, which is upper bounded by OPT COPIES-UD . By [13] , OPT COPIES-UD is at most 2 · SREV. LEMMA 6.2. For any BIC mechanism M , SINGLE(M ) ≤ OPT COPIES-UD ≤ 2 · SREV.
We decompose NON-FAVORITE(M ) into two terms CORE(M ) and TAIL(M ), and bound them separately. For every t ∈ T , define
Here the threshold c is chosen as
Since v(t, ·) is subadditive for all t ∈ T , we have for every S ⊆ [m], v(t, S) ≤ v (t, S ∩ C(t))+ j∈S∩T (t) V (tj). We decompose NON-FAVORITE(M ) based on the inequality above.
Using the definition of c and SREV, we can upper bound TAIL(M ) with a similar argument as in [9] . We postpone the proof to the full version of the paper due to space limit. = v(t, S ∩ C(t)). We argue that v (t, ·) is drawn from a distribution that is subadditive over independent items and v (·, ·) is c-Lipschitz (see Definition 6.6). Using a concentration bound by Schechtman [41] , we show Et[v (t, [m])] is upper bounded by the median of random variable v (t, [m]) and c, which are upper bounded by BREV and SREV respectively. LEMMA 6.5. For any BIC mechanism M , CORE(M ) ≤ 3 · SREV + 4 · BREV.
Recall that
We will bound CORE(M ) with a concentration inequality from [41] . It requires the following definition: Definition 6.6. A function v(·, ·) is a-Lipschitz if for any type t, t ∈ T , and set X,
where X∆Y = (X\Y ) ∪ (Y \X) is the symmetric difference between X and Y .
Define a new valuation function for the bidder as v (t, S) = v(t, S ∩ C(t)), for all t ∈ T and S ⊆ [m]. Then v (·, ·) is c− Lipschitz, and when t is drawn from the product distribution D = j Dj, v (t, ·) remains to be a valuation drawn from a distribution that is subadditive over independent items.
Next, we apply the following concentration inequality to derive Corollary 6.8, which is useful to analyze the CORE(M ). The proof of Corollary 6.8 can be found in the full version. LEMMA 6.7.
[41] Let g(t, ·) with t ∼ D = j Dj be a function drawn from a distribution that is subadditive over independent items of ground set I. If g(·, ·) is c-Lipschitz, then for all a > 0, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |I|}, q ∈ N,
COROLLARY 6.8. Let g(t, ·) with t ∼ D = j Dj be a function drawn from a distribution that is subadditive over independent items of ground set I. If g(·, ·) is c-Lipschitz, then if we let a be the median of the value of the grand bundle g(t, I), i.e. a = inf
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 6.5. Proof of Lemma 6.5: Let δ be the median of v (t, [m]) when t is sampled from distribution D. Now consider the mechanism that sells the grand bundle with price δ. Notice that the bidder's valuation for the grand bundle is v(t, [m]) ≥ v (t, [m]). Thus with probability at least 1 2 ,the bidder purchases the bundle. Thus, BREV ≥ 1 2 δ. According to Corollary 6.8,
It remains to argue that the Lipchitz constant c can be upper bounded using SREV. Notice that by AM-GM Inequality,
Consider the mechanism that posts price c for each item but only allow the buyer to purchase one item. Then with probability at least 1 − e −2 , the mechanism sells one item obtaining expected revenue
Proof of Theorem 6.1: Since OPT COPIES-UD ≤ 2SREV (Lemma 6.2) and NON-FAVORITE(M ) ≤ 5SREV+4BREV (Lemma 6.4 and 6.5), REV(M, v, D) ≤ 24· SREV +16· BREV according to Theorem 5.5. 2
MULTIPLE BIDDERS
In this section, we prove our main result -simple mechanisms can approximate the optimal BIC revenue even when there are multiple XOS/subadditive bidders. Due to space limit, the complete proofs of most lemmas are postponed to the full version. First, we need the definition of supporting prices. Definition 7.1 (Supporting Prices [21] ). For any α ≥ 1, a type t and a subset S ⊆ [m], prices {pj}j∈S are α-supporting prices for v(t, S) if (i) v(t, S ) ≥ j∈S pj for all S ⊆ S and (ii) j∈S pj ≥ v(t,S) α . THEOREM 7.2. If for any buyer i, any type ti ∈ Ti and any bundle S ∈ [m], vi(ti, S) has a set of α-supporting prices {θ S j (ti)}j∈S, then for any BIC mechanism M and any constant b ∈ (0, 1),
If vi(ti, ·) is an XOS valuation for all i and ti ∈ Ti, then α = 1. By setting b to 1 4 , we have REV(M, v, D) ≤ 236 · POSTREV + 32 · APOSTENREV. For general subadditive valuations, α = O(log(m)) by [3] , hence REV(M, v, D) ≤ O(log(m)) · max{POSTREV, APOSTENREV}.
Here is a sketch of the proof for Theorem 7. Analysis of SINGLE(M, β): we construct β according to b and M and bound SINGLE(M, β) by OPT COPIES-UD with a proof similar to Lemma 6.2. Moreover, [13, 34] showed that there exists an RSP-M achieving at least OPT COPIES-UD /6 revenue. Combining the two statements above, we have Lemma 7.3. Since vi(ti, ·) is subadditive for all i and ti ∈ Ti, we have vi(ti, S) ≤ vi (ti, S ∩ Ci(ti)) + j∈S∩T i (t i ) Vi(tij). The term NON-FAVORITE(M, β) can be decomposed into TAIL(M, β) and CORE(M, β) based on the inequality above.
LEMMA 7.5. 11 In [9] , NON-FAVORITE is decomposed into four different terms UNDER, OVER, CORE and TAIL. We essentially merge the first three terms into CORE(M, β) in our decomposition.
NON-FAVORITE(M, β)
≤ i t i fi(ti) S⊆[m] σ (β) iS (ti) · vi(ti, S ∩ Ci(ti)) (CORE(M, β)) + i j t ij :V i (t ij )≥β ij +c i fij(tij) · Vi(tij)· k =j Pr t ik [Vi(t ik ) − β ik ≥ Vi(tij) − βij] (TAIL(M, β))
Analyzing TAIL(M, β) in the Multi-Bidder Case
In this section we show how to bound TAIL(M, β) with the revenue of an RSPM. LEMMA 7.6. For any BIC mechanism M , TAIL(M, β)
We first fix a few notations. Let
ri = j rij, and r = i ri. We show in the following Lemma that r is an upper bound of TAIL(M, β). Readers can find the proof in the full version of the paper. LEMMA 7.7. For any BIC mechanism M , TAIL(M, β) ≤ r.
Next, we argue that r can be approximated by an RSPM. Indeed, we prove a stronger lemma, which is also useful for analyzing CORE(M, β). PROOF. Consider a RSPM that sells item j to buyer i at price ξij = xij + βij. The mechanism visits the buyers in some arbitrary order. Notice that when it is buyer i's turn, she purchases exactly item j and pays xij + βij if all of the following three conditions hold: (i) j is still available, (ii) Vi(tij) ≥ xij + βij and (iii) ∀k = j, Vi(t ik ) < x ik + β ik . The second condition means buyer i can afford item j. The third condition means she cannot afford any other item k = j. Therefore, buyer i's purchases exactly item j. Now let us compute the probability that all three conditions hold. Since every buyer's valuation is subadditive over the items, item j is purchased by someone else only if there exists a buyer k = i who has V k (t kj ) ≥ ξ kj . Because x kj ≥ 0 for all k, by the union bound, the event described above happens with probability at most k =i Prt kj [V k (t kj ) ≥ β kj ], which is less than b by property (i) of Lemma 5.6. Therefore, condition (i) holds with probability at least (1 − b). Clearly, condition (ii) holds with probability Prt ij [Vi(tij) ≥ xij + βij]. Finally, condition (iii) holds with at least probability 1/2, because according to our assumption of the xijs, the probability that there exists any item k = j such that Vi(t ik ) ≥ x ik + β ik is no more than 1/2. Since the three conditions are independent, buyer i purchases exactly item j with probability at least (1−b) 2 · Prt ij [Vi(tij) ≥ xij + βij]. So the expected revenue of this mechanism is at least ( 
Proof of Lemma 7.6: Since Pij ≥ ci, it satisfies the assumption in Lemma 7.8 due to the choice of ci . Therefore,
Our statement follows from the above inequality and Lemma 7.7.2
Analyzing CORE(M, β) in the Multi-Bidder Case
In this section we upper bound CORE(M, β). Recall that
We can view it as the welfare of another valuation function v under allocation σ (β) where v i (ti, S) = vi(ti, S ∩ Ci(ti)). In other words, we "truncate" the function at some threshold, i.e., only evaluate the items whose value on its own is less than that threshold.
The new function still satisfies monotonicity, subadditivity and no externalities.
We first compare existing methods for analyzing the CORE with our approach before jumping into the proofs.
Comparison between the Existing Methods and Our
Approach. As all results in the literature [9, 13, 16, 45] only study special cases of constrained additive valuations, we restrict our attention to constrained additive valuations in the comparison, but our approach also applies to XOS and subadditive valuations.
We compare our approach to the state of the art result by Chawla and Miller [16] . They separate CORE(M, β) into two parts: (i) the welfare obtained from values below β, and (ii) the welfare obtained from values between β and β + c 12 . It is not hard to show that the latter can be upper bounded by the revenue of a sequential posted price with per bidder entry fee mechanism. Due to their choice of β (similar to the second property of Lemma 5.6), the former is upper bounded by i,j βij · Prt ij [tij ≥ βij]. It turns out when every bidder's feasibility constraint is a matroid, one can use the OCRS from [25] to design a sequential posted price mechanism to approximate this expression. However, as we show in Example 7.24, i,j βij · Prt ij [tij ≥ βij] could be Ω √ m log m times larger than the optimal social welfare when the bidders have general downward closed feasibility constraints. Hence, such approach cannot yield any constant factor approximation for general constrained additive valuations.
As explained in the intro, we take an entirely different approach. We first construct the posted prices {Qj} j∈[m] for our ASPE (Definition 7.10), Feldman et al. [24] showed that the anonymous posted price mechanism with these prices achieves welfare Ω (CORE(M, β) ). If all bidders have valuations that are subadditive over independent items, for any bidder i and any set of available items S, i's surplus for S under valuation v i (ti, ·) (max S ⊆S v i (ti, S ) − j∈S Qj) is also subadditive over independent items. According to Talagrand's concentration inequality, the surplus concentrates and its expectation is upper bounded by its median and its Lipschitz constant a. One can to the second part is j∈S (tij − βij ) + · 1 [tij < βij + ci] extract at least half of the median by setting the median of the surplus as the entry fee. How about the Lipschitz constant a? Unfortunately, a could be as large as 1 2 max j∈[m] {βij + ci}, which is too large to be bounded.
Here is how we overcome this difficulty. Instead of considering v , we construct a new valuationv that is always dominated by the true valuation v. We consider the social welfare induced by σ (β) underv and define it as CORE(M, β). In Section 7.2.2, we show that CORE(M, β) is not too far away from CORE(M, β), so it suffices to approximate CORE(M, β) (Lemma 7.17). But why is CORE(M, β) easier to approximate? The reason is two-fold. (i) For any bidder i and any set of available items S, bidder i's surplus for S undervi(ti, ·) (defined as µi(ti, S) in Definition 7.18, which is max S ⊆Svi (ti, S ) − j∈S Qj), is not only subadditive over independent items, but also has a small Lipschitz constant τi (Lemma 7.19). Indeed, these Lipschitz constants are so small that i τi and can be upper bounded by POSTREV (Lemma 7.15). (ii) If we set the entry fee of our ASPE to be the median of µi(ti, S) when ti is drawn from Di, using a proof inspired by Feldman et al. [24] , we can show that our ASPE's revenue collected from the posted prices plus the expected surplus of the bidders (over the randomness of all bidders' types) approximates CORE(M, β) (implied by Lemma 7.20) . Again by Talagrand's concentration inequality, we can bound bidder i's expected surplus by our entry fee and τi (Lemma 7.22). Asv is always smaller than the true valuation v, thus for any type ti of bidder i and any available items S, the surplus for S under vi(ti, ·) must be larger than µi(ti, S), and the entry fee is accepted with probability at least 1/2. Putting everything together, we demonstrate that we can approximate CORE(M, β) with an ASPE or an RSPM (Lemma 7.23).
Construction of CORE(M, β)
. We first show that if for any i and ti ∈ Ti there is a set of α-supporting prices for vi(ti, ·), then there is a set of α-supporting prices for v i (ti, ·). LEMMA 7.9. If for any type ti and any set S, there exists a set of α-supporting prices {θ S j (ti)}j∈S for vi(ti, ·), then for any ti and S there also exists a set of α-supporting prices {γ S j (ti)}j∈S for v i (ti, ·). In particular, γ S j (ti) = θ S∩C i (t i ) j (ti) if j ∈ S ∩ Ci(ti) and γ S j (ti) = 0 otherwise. Moreover, γ S j (ti) ≤ Vi(tij) · 1[Vi(tij) < βij + ci] for all i, ti, j and S.
Next, we define the prices of our ASPE. Definition 7.10. We define a price Qj for each item j as follows,
where {γ S j (ti)}j∈S are the α-supporting prices of v i (ti, ·) and set S for any bidder i and type ti ∈ Ti. In the following definitions, we define CORE(M, β) which is the welfare of another functionv under the same allocation σ (β) .
7.2.3
Design and Analysis of Our ASPE. Consider the sequential post-price mechanism with anonymous posted price Qj for item j. We visit the buyers in the alphabetical order 13 and charge every bidder an entry fee. We define the entry fee here. For any type profile t ∈ T and any bidder i, let the entry fee for bidder i be
where S1(t<1) = [m] and Si(t<i) is the set of items that are not purchased by the first i − 1 buyers in the ASPE. Notice that even though the seller does not know t<i, she can compute the entry fee δi(Si(t<i)), as she observes Si(t<i) after visiting the first i − 1 bidders. In Lemma 7.19 , we show that τi is the Lipschitz constant for µi(·, ·). Moreover, i τi is upper bounded by 4 1−b · POSTREV due to Lemma 7.15. LEMMA 7.19. For any i, the function µi(·, ·) is τi-Lipschitz. Moreover, for any type ti ∈ Ti, µi(ti, ·) satisfies monotonicity, subadditivity and no externalities.
The following Lemma is crucial for our proof. We show that in expectation over all type profiles, we can lower bound of the sum of µi(ti, Si(t<i)) for all bidders. In particular, this lower bound plus our ASPE's revenue from the posted prices already approximates CORE(M, β). The proof is inspired by Feldman et al. [24] and can be found in the full version of the paper. LEMMA 7.20. For all j, let Qj (Definition 7.10) be the price for item j and every bidder's entry fee be described as in Definition 7.18. For every type profile t ∈ T , let SOLD(t) be the set of items sold in the corresponding ASPE. Then Since entry fee in the ASPE for every bidder as the median of her utility over the available items underv. Clearly, bidders accept the entry fee with probability at least 1/2, as their true utilities (under v) are always higher than their utilities underv. Combining the concentration property of the utility underv and Lemma 7.20, we can argue that the total revenue from our ASPE is comparable to CORE(M, β), and therefore is comparable to CORE(M, β). LEMMA 7.21. For all i and t<i, bidder i accepts δi(t<i) with probability at least 1/2 when ti is drawn from Di. Moreover,
PROOF. For any bidder i, type ti ∈ Ti and any set S, define bidder i's utility as ui(ti, S) = max S ⊆S vi(ti, S )− j∈S Qj . Clearly, ui(ti, S) ≥ µi(ti, S) for any type ti and set S. For any t<i, as long as ui(ti, Si(t<i)) ≥ δi(Si(t<i)), buyer i accepts the entry fee. Since δi(Si(t<i)) is the median of µi(ti, t<i), ui(ti, Si(t<i)) ≥ δi(Si(t<i)) with probability at least 1/2 when ti is drawn from Di. So the revenue from entry fee is at least 1 2 · i Et <i [δi (Si(t<i))] . For any i and t<i, by Lemma 7.19 and Corollary 6.8, we are able to derive a lower bound for δi (Si(t<i)), as shown in Lemma 7.22. The proof is postponed to the full version. According to Lemma 7.22, the revenue from the entry fee is at least 1 4 · i Et <i ,t i [µi(ti, Si(t<i))] − 5 8 · i τi, which is equal to Let bidders be constrained additive and Fi be bidder i feasibility constraint. We use PF i = conv({1 S |S ∈ Fi}) to denote the feasibility polytope of bidder i. Let {qij} i∈[n],j∈[m] be a collection of probabilities that satisfy i qij ≤ 1/2 for all item j and q i = (qi1, . . . , qim) ∈ b · PF i . Let βij = F −1 ij (qij). The analysis by Chawla and Miller [16] needs to upper bound i,j βij · qij using the revenue of some BIC mechanism. When Fi is a matroid for every bidder i, this expression can be upper bounded by the revenue of a sequential posted price mechanism constructed using OCRS from [25] . Here we show that if the bidders have general downward closed feasibility constraints, this expression is gigantic. More specifically, we prove that even when there is only one bidder, the expression could be Ω √ m log m times larger than the optimal social welfare.
Consider the following example.
Example 7.24. The seller is selling m = k 2 items to a single bidder. The bidder's value for each item is drawn i.i.d. from distribution F , which is the equal revenue distribution truncated at k, i.e.,
Items are divided into k disjoint sets A1, ..., A k , each with size k. The bidder is additive subject to feasibility constraint F = {S ⊆ [m]|∃i ∈ [k], S ⊆ Ai}.
LEMMA 7.25. Let PF = conv({1 S |S ∈ F}) be the feasibility polytope for the bidder in Example 7.24. Let SW be the optimal social welfare. Then for any constant b > 0, there exists q ∈ b · PF such that for sufficiently large k,
PROOF. For any b > 0, consider the following feasible allocation rule: w.p. (1 − b), don't allocate anything, and w.p. b, give the buyer one of the sets Ai uniformly at random. The corresponding ex-ante probability vector q satisfies qj = b k , ∀j ∈ [m]. Thus q ∈ b · PF . Since qj < 1 k , F −1 (1 − qj) = k for all j ∈ [m]. We have j∈[m] qj · F −1 (1 − qj) = k 2 · b k · k = b · k 2 . We use Vi to denote the random variable of the bidder's value for set Ai. It is not hard to see that SW = E[max i∈[k] Vi]. Since Vi is the sum of k i.i.d. random variables with cdf F , according to the Bernstein concentration inequality, Pr [Vi > 3 · k log(k)] ≤ k −3 for all i ∈ [k]. By the union bound, Pr[max i∈[k] Vi > 3 · k log(k)] ≤ k −2 . Therefore, E[max i∈ [k] Vi] ≤ 3k log k + k 2 · k −2 ≤ 4k log k.
